at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/energy-and-security-updates. Other papers produced in collaboration with IEF include the background papers for the fourth, fifth, and sixth IEA-IEF-OPEC Symposium on Energy Outlooks, and a paper focused on the methodology for comparing IEA, OPEC, and other institutions' long-term energy outlooks.
Because of its massive scale and long-lived capital stock, the energy system tends to change slowly. However, recent years have seen faster-than-expected shifts on several key fronts, including oil supply and prices, demand for coal, and the deployment of renewable electricity technologies. We begin by briefly describing some of these recent developments, then note several major trends currently underway that appear likely to continue.
Global energy markets have undergone substantial changes in recent years. First, unconventional oil and gas production has grown in North America more rapidly than most analyses had projected. This growth has dramatically affected North American natural gas supply and prices, and more recently has contributed to the 2014 collapse in global oil prices. Other factors, such as OPEC nations' decision to increase production, and weaker-than-anticipated demand from developing nations such as China, have also contributed to the decline in oil prices from more than $100 per barrel in mid-2014 to less than $50 through most of 2015. These low prices have forced companies to slow investment in high-cost prospects such as deepwater, oil sands, or in the arctic, and nations heavily dependent on oil export revenues such as Nigeria, Venezuela, and Russia are facing fiscal challenges, potentially increasing political instability.
Second, costs for renewable electricity, led by wind and solar, have fallen more quickly than expected, making them cost-competitive with other fuel sources in some regions. While their deployment has grown rapidly, wind and solar still provide a very small share of the world's electricity. Most projections show these sources continuing to expand quickly, with further cost reductions and policy support from governments both contributing.
Third, the focus on a new global agreement for reducing greenhouse gas emissions culminated in late 2015 with agreement among almost all countries on a "bottom-up, pledge-andreview" approach. Most major emitters, including the United States, China, India, and European nations have now pledged to reduce or slow the growth rate of greenhouse gas emissions, representing the most inclusive global climate agreement to date. Finally, energy demand growth in China in 2014 was far more modest than most projections had anticipated. Despite reported GDP growth of more than seven percent, energy demand grew by roughly two percent from 2013 to 2014, and coal consumption remained roughly constant (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015) . If accurate, this slowed growth rate will have occurred years before projections had anticipated, substantially easing global energy demand in the coming decades.
While important shifts in the energy landscape have occurred in recent years, several key trends have continued apace or accelerated. First, global energy demand continues to grow rapidly. Most projections show energy demand growing in absolute terms to 2040 as much or more than it has over previous multi-decade periods, although the rate of growth will be slower in percentage terms. Consumption of all fossil fuels grows under most projections, with coal, oil, and natural gas providing 70 percent or more of total primary energy in 2040 under all projections evaluated here except the IEA 450 scenario, where the fossil share declines to 59 percent in 2040. Note that the share of fossil fuels is larger in outlooks that exclude non-marketed energy. For example, the IEA estimates the fossil fuel share was 82 percent in 2012, while BP estimates it was 90 percent.
Second, global energy demand continues to shift eastward. Although China's energy consumption growth slows in all projections, India, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian nations drive continued demand growth in the region. Energy trade flows will continue to shift eastward, as coal and oil imports grow in Asia while North America becomes a net energy exporter. Europe continues to be a net energy importer, while all other regions, led by the Middle East, provide growing shares of global energy supplies.
Finally, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions continue to grow under most projections.
Developed economies in North America, Europe, and elsewhere generally see their CO2 emissions decline, remain roughly flat, or grow very slowly. Developing economies, led by Asia, contribute all net growth in CO2 emissions under most projections. National policies and international climate agreements have the potential to alter this trajectory, but at current levels of stringency are more consistent with an expected rise in average global temperature of close to 3°C or more, than international goals of 2°C or less.
Energy outlooks play an important role in helping understand how the global energy system may evolve by providing detailed quantitative estimates of future energy consumption patterns, supply sources, technological trends, carbon dioxide emissions, and more. A number of organizations issue such outlooks on a regular basis, helping to inform energy producers, consumers, policymakers, and other stakeholders. These organizations include the International Energy Agency (IEA), the U.S. Energy Information Administration (U.S. EIA), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and major energy companies such as BP, ExxonMobil, and Shell. In this paper, we examine projections from the following publications: These outlooks vary due to a variety of factors, including distinct modeling techniques, different historical data, varying economic growth assumptions, and a variety of policy scenarios.
Generally, policy scenarios can be grouped into three categories: (1) business-as-usual scenarios, which assume no major policy changes; (2) "best guess" scenarios, which incorporate the modeling team's expectations of policy trends; and (3) alternative scenarios, which are typically based on certain policy targets or technology assumptions (Newell & Iler, 2013) . Each of these approaches are represented in the outlooks we examine, summarized in Table 1 .
Note: ExxonMobil and BP outlooks each provide one untitled scenario. Different scenarios and modeling assumptions can produce informative variations between outlooks, allowing analysts to view a wide range of potential energy futures. However, outlooks also have a variety of important methodological differences, which can make direct comparison between outlooks challenging and complicate a reader's ability to draw insights.
One key difference between outlooks is assumptions about the energy content of fossil fuels.
Some outlooks present original fossil fuels data in fuel-specific physical units, such as million barrels of oil-equivalent per day (mboed), metric tonnes of coal-equivalent (mtce) and trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas, while others present data directly in energy units such as quadrillion ( 10 15 ) British thermal units (qBtu), million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe), or exajoules (EJ). 1 Different assumptions about the energy content of fuels result in different conversion factors between data presented in energy units from those presented in physical units. Among the outlooks we examine, these assumptions can vary by 2 to 12 percent. While these differences in conversion units may appear small, they can produce significant differences when applied across the massive scale of global energy systems, and particularly over multi-decade time horizons. Another important difference results from varying decisions over whether to include non-marketed biomass such as wood or dung in historical data and projections. The inclusion of these fuels can yield a 10 to 14 percent difference in global primary energy consumption. Other differences in outlooks include, but are not limited to: (1) different definitions of primary energy consumption from non-combustible fuels such as nuclear and non-biomass renewables; (2) different categorizations for liquids fuels and renewable energy; and (3) different regional groupings for presenting aggregated data and projections.
To address these challenges, Newell and Qian (2015) developed a harmonization process to allow for more accurate comparison across outlooks. We apply that harmonization process here.
Energy projections are inherently uncertain. Despite their imperfections, and in some cases because of them, an analysis of multiple forward-looking projections can provide insight into the range of possibilities facing tomorrow's energy producers and consumers. While this paper focuses on the future, retrospective analysis of previous energy projections can also yield lessons by revealing unanticipated trends or "black swan" events. We discuss below two areas where past projections deviated substantially from eventual reality: unconventional U.S. oil and gas production, and total energy consumption in China and the United States, the two largest energy consumers.
Throughout the mid-to late-2000s, the U.S. EIA, IEA, and ExxonMobil projected natural gas production in the United States to remain roughly flat while consumption grew. As a result, projections showed prices steadily rising and imports growing substantially.
However, technological advancements and experimentation led to a breakthrough in economically producing natural gas from shale and other tight formations, surprising most forecasters, policymakers, and even most major energy companies. The diffusion of these technologies to shale plays in Texas, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and other states has led to a rapid rise in U.S. natural gas production. Around the same time, the "great recession" weakened demand across the economy, creating a glut of natural gas and a collapse in prices. Despite these low prices, natural gas production has continued to rise, and today's projections show natural gas production growing far more rapidly than previous forecasts (see Figure 1 ).
Data sources: U.S. EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2005 , 2010 Reference Cases (U.S. EIA, 2005a , 2010a , 2013a , 2015a . Historical production from U.S. EIA (2015e). The unconventional gas revolution has affected not only domestic producers and consumers, but also international markets. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies originally destined for North American import terminals have turned elsewhere for buyers, and LNG export terminals are currently under construction in the United States, further increasing global LNG supply, lowering global LNG prices and speeding the decline of oil-linked natural gas contracts. The first of these LNG liquefaction and export facilities, located in Sabine Pass, Louisiana, is scheduled to begin production in early 2016.
Along similar lines, oil production in the United States since 2010 has grown far more rapidly than projected (see Figure 2) , with major global consequences. Due to the application of the same types of technologies that made shale gas profitable, production of light tight oil (LTO) from the Bakken/Three Forks, Eagle Ford, Permian, and other plays has driven U.S. oil production to levels not seen since the mid-1980s. This surge in LTO, the decision of OPEC nations not to restrain production, and lower-than-expected demand drove global benchmark oil prices down by more than 50 percent from about $100 per barrel in mid-2014 to $50 per barrel by the start of 2015,
and then to about $30 per barrel by early 2016. This crash in oil prices is having large implications for global petroleum consumers, energy investment decision-makers, and governments.
Data sources: U.S. EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2005 , 2010 Reference Cases (U.S. EIA, 2005a , 2010a , 2013a , 2015a . Historical production from U.S. EIA (2015f). Trends in regional energy consumption growth vary based on multiple factors, including economic structure and growth, technological development, and a variety of policies. These factors change over time, often in ways that analysts find difficult to predict. One example is the upward revision of forecasts for global energy consumption (Figure 3) , with worldwide projections pushed steadily higher as Asian economies grew more rapidly than expected over the previous twenty years.
A second example is the underestimate of China's energy consumption growth. Moderate and steady growth was projected during the mid-1990s, but demand skyrocketed as China's economy grew at rates of 10 percent or greater over much of the following 15 years. As a result, Chinese energy consumption in 2010 was roughly twice the level projected by the U.S. EIA in 1995.
As Figure 4 shows, the U. EIA, 1995 EIA, , 2000 EIA, , 2005b EIA, , 2010b EIA, , 2013b . Historical consumption from U.S. EIA (2015c). EIA, 1995 EIA, , 2000 EIA, , 2005b EIA, , 2010b EIA, , 2013b . Historical consumption from U.S. EIA (2015c).
Data source: U.S. EIA International Energy Outlook Reference Cases (U.S. EIA, 1995 EIA, , 2000 EIA, , 2005b EIA, , 2010b EIA, , 2013b . Historical consumption from U.S. EIA (2015c). This section focuses on primary energy consumption, including long-term trends, major drivers of primary energy demand growth, and regional variations. Figure 6 and Table 2 show historical global primary energy consumption patterns and a range of projections through 2040, measured in both qBtu and mboed. Shell (2013) . h BP (2015). i U.S. EIA (2013b). Notes: The conversion rate is 0.51 mboed/qBtu, based on 7.33 boe/toe and 0.03968 qBtu/mtoe. Fuel-specific energy consumption figures from each source were converted to primary energy in qBtu using a consistent set of rules to ensure comparability across sources; details available in Newell and Qian (2015) . Energy consumption can be understood as the combination of three factors: population, GDP per-capita, and energy intensity of the economy (i.e., energy used per unit of GDP). These three factors, with the addition of a carbon intensity factor (carbon emission per unit of energy), can also be used to decompose factors underlying carbon emissions growth over time. When considering policies and other decisions relevant to the energy sector, stakeholders tend to focus on the energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of energy, as population growth is generally outside the domain of energy policy and increasing GDP per capita is a common growth objective. However, population and GDP assumptions can vary between projections, affecting forecasts.
Energy intensity is tied to the efficiency of the capital stock (e.g., vehicles, buildings, industrial equipment), the composition of the economy (e.g., services versus manufacturing), and individual energy consumption patterns. Many policies affect these factors, ranging from the macro scale (e.g., industrial policy in more centrally-planned economies) to end-use products (e.g., efficiency standards for appliances and vehicles). Carbon intensity is largely determined by the carbon content of the fuels in the energy mix. Policies that directly affect carbon intensity include national or regional emissions standards and/or carbon pricing, efficiency standards, subsidies for non-CO2 energy sources, and -conversely -subsidies for fossil fuel consumption or production.
We discuss the key drivers of regional energy consumption and CO2 emissions below. Table 4 shows key factors underlying global and regional energy consumption in 2012. With more than half of global population, Asia-Pacific contributes a larger share than any region in absolute terms of GDP (36 percent), energy consumption (41 percent), and CO2 emissions (45 percent). However, Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America are well behind OECD Americas, Europe/Eurasia and the Middle East in terms of GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita. OECD Americas far exceeds all other regions in GDP per capita and energy consumption per capita, both roughly 70 percent higher than the next region, Europe and Eurasia. The AsiaPacific region is the world's most carbon-intensive, largely due to a heavy reliance on energyintensive manufacturing and coal-fired electricity.
Industrialized economies such as those in OECD Americas, Europe and Eurasia, and the Middle East display roughly similar carbon intensity figures. In Latin America and especially Africa, substantial portions of the population lack access to modern energy services, and a large share of the energy that is consumed is provided by hydro and traditional biomass, leading to a relatively low carbon intensity of energy. Africa and Latin America together consume only 11 percent of the world's energy despite being home to 22 percent of its population. Table 5 Data source: New Policies Scenario in IEA (2014f). Notes: a Europe and Eurasia includes OECD Europe and Eastern Europe/Eurasia. Asia Pacific includes OECD Asia Oceania and non-OECD Asia, all based on IEA regional definitions. Other regional groupings are as defined in the IEA WEO2014. b Regional sums do not exactly equal world totals because only the latter includes oil transport bunkers. The ratios in the bottom four rows are calculated from the values in the first four rows. Primary energy data include non-marketed energy such as traditional biomass. Some sources such as the U.S. EIA and BP do not include non-marketed energy. As a result, IEA primary energy and energy intensity estimates for Africa and non-OECD Asia are notably higher than sources that do not include non-marketed energy. This also leads IEA estimates for carbon intensity (CO2/energy) for Africa and non-OECD Asia to be lower relative to the U.S. EIA, as biomass is treated as a zero net-CO2-emissions fuel.
Along with population growth, migration patterns are an important demographic factor for energy consumption projections. One major trend over the projection period is urbanization. In most projections, the global share of population living in urban areas will rise from roughly 50 percent in 2010 to more than 60 percent by 2040, with the most rapid transitions in non-OECD Asia and Africa. This trend may result in noticeably higher per capita energy consumption in these regions, as urban households tend to consume more energy than those in rural regions (ExxonMobil, 2015) .
Most outlooks assume that world GDP (in purchasing power parity, or PPP terms) will grow at an average rate of 3.4 to 3. Average annual growth rates range from 5.7 to 6.1 percent in India compared with 5.0 to 5.7 percent in China. Growth in OECD Europe and OECD Asia/Oceania continues along recent trend lines, growing more slowly than other regions at 1.6 to 1.8 percent per year. Between these two regional extremes, annual GDP growth rates are in the range of 4.1 to 4.7 percent for Africa, 3.1 to 3.3 percent for Latin America, and 2.2 to 2.6 for OECD Americas. A wider range of estimates emerges for Eastern Europe/Eurasia (2.5 to 3.8 percent) and the Middle East (2.2 to 3.6 percent).
Per capita GDP roughly doubles globally over the projection period, with the fastest rates of growth in Asia-Pacific (particularly China and India) and Africa. However, GDP per capita in these regions remains low relative to OECD nations, with Asia-Pacific nations averaging roughly onethird the level in OECD Americas, and Africa averaging just 11 percent of OECD Americas GDP per capita in 2040.
Importantly, the long-term economic assumptions made in these outlooks tend to assume steady growth, and do not anticipate recessions, wars, or other events that can dramatically alter economic trends. These uncertainties are typically addressed through broad high/low growth scenarios in some projections, though unexpected shifts in economic and technological trends can have large implications on energy demand projections, as we discussed in Section 3.
With the exceptions of OPEC and Shell, all outlooks examined here make regional projections for primary energy consumption. Under all projections other than the IEA 450 Scenario, 75 to 90 percent of global energy consumption growth occurs in the East (a regional grouping we create that includes all of Asia-Oceania, the Middle East and Africa) due to its rapid economic and population growth. Asia-Oceania contributes the bulk of this new demand, accounting for 60 to 70 percent of total global consumption growth, while the Middle East and Africa cumulatively account for 20 to 30 percent. In the West (the rest of the world), the majority of growth comes from the Americas, with Europe and Eurasia expected to experience flat (or in ExxonMobil's case, negative) growth. Under the IEA 450 Scenario, global energy consumption rises slowly, with consumption growing in the East and declining in the West.
Energy intensity can be measured either in energy consumption per unit of economic output (energy/GDP) or energy consumption per capita (energy/population). Energy use per GDP has declined substantially over time, and the IEA, U.S. EIA and ExxonMobil project this trend to accelerate. As shown in Table 4 and Table 5 On a related note, carbon intensity can vary substantially depending on whether nonmarketed biomass is included. For example, the IEA and U.S. EIA respectively estimate that Africa emitted 36 and 74 million metric tonnes of CO2 per qBTU of energy consumption in 2012. This difference is due to the U.S. EIA's exclusion of non-marketed biomass in primary energy consumption, substantially reducing the denominator in a CO2/qBTU calculation. If non-marketed biomass is included in primary energy, Latin America and Africa are the least carbon-intensive economies both now and in the future under IEA and ExxonMobil projections.
Regional trends in energy trade are shifting due to changing consumption patterns and supply sources (Figure 7) . In recent years, the most notable change in energy supply is increased oil and gas production in North America, particularly the United States. These new supplies, coupled with almost flat consumption growth, has decreased net imports of crude oil and petroleum products in the United States from more than 10 mb/d during most of the 2000's to 5 mb/d in 2014 (U.S. EIA, 2015g). By the end of the projection period, North America is a net exporter of coal and natural gas under all IEA scenarios. However, the United States still imports roughly six mb/d of crude oil under the IEA New Policies Scenario in 2040. The United States is already a major exporter of refined petroleum products such as diesel and gasoline, and a small amount of crude oil exports had also become a reality as of early 2016. Notes: Energy balances (net exports) are calculated by the authors by subtracting regional fuel consumption from production data in the IEA New Policies Scenario (2014f).
Despite the potential re-emergence of the United States as a net energy exporter, the Middle East and Russia/Caspian region will continue to be the leading exporters of oil and gas. Due to Russia's central role in interregional gas trade, recent conflicts in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have raised concern about security of gas supply. Gas-importing countries in Europe and Asia are likely to seek supply diversification, including new pipelines and LNG supplies, though they will likely remain reliant on natural gas supplies from Russia.
Latin America and Africa are also net exporters of fossil fuels. Latin America sees a substantial increase in oil exports in all IEA scenarios, mainly due to rising oil output from Brazil's pre-salt fields (i.e., found below the salt layer), though investment in these fields is likely to slow if oil prices remain around their 2014 to 2015 levels. Africa's contribution to interregional trade is likely to remain fairly flat over the projection period due to domestic economic development and rising energy demand.
OECD Europe will continue to be a major energy importer, and Asia-Pacific will increasingly dominate global energy imports. Total Asia-Pacific energy imports nearly double over the 2012-2040 period, with roughly two-thirds of this growth coming from China and India. For OECD Europe, projected energy imports in 2040 are similar to current levels, but the fuel composition of those imports will likely change. As Figure 7 shows, oil imports to OECD Europe are on a path to decrease as a result of enhanced vehicle efficiency, while natural gas imports are likely to increase due to fuel-switching in power generation and other sectors.
This section discusses the evolution of and projections for the global fuel mix. Table 6 summarizes the past, current, and projected future shares of fossil fuels, nuclear energy and renewables in thirty-year intervals. Over the projection period, the global energy portfolio changes slowly due to the massive scale and long-lived capital investments involved in the energy system. Looking forward, most outlooks project a modest decline in oil's share of the fuel mix, though in absolute terms oil demand sees robust growth under projections other than the IEA 450 Scenario. Oil becomes even more highly concentrated in the transportation and petrochemicals sectors, and almost all demand growth comes from developing countries. In developed economies, oil demand growth is flat or negative, primarily due to more stringent vehicle fuel economy standards and continued fuel switching to lower-cost and cleaner fuels in the industrial sector.
Another useful lens for examining trends in oil is through consumption in the transportation sector. Because of its heavy reliance on a single fuel, transportation is more vulnerable to supply disruptions and price shocks than other sectors. This lack of diversity continues under most projections, with oil providing roughly 85 to 90 percent of transportation energy supply in 2040.
Under the IEA 450 Scenario, petroleum falls to 63 percent, displaced by electricity, biofuels, and to a lesser extent natural gas and hydrogen.
Natural gas is the only fossil fuel whose share of the mix has steadily grown from 1950 to 2010, and growth continues under all scenarios over the next thirty years. The largest demand increase continues to come from the power sector, where natural gas' relatively high efficiency, low emissions of CO2 and other pollutants, and low capital costs help it displace coal and oil. However, natural gas also competes with zero-carbon sources such as nuclear and renewable sources, resulting in a lower share for natural gas in the IEA 450 scenario. Natural gas is poised to overtake coal in OECD nations as the leading fuel for power generation around 2025, while its share of the market grows more slowly in non-OECD nations.
Nuclear power emerged as a major energy technology in the second half of the twentieth century, adding diversity to the fuel mix and providing an important zero-emission baseload power source. The share of nuclear power in the overall energy mix rose from zero in 1950 to 6 percent by 2010. However, concerns over accidents, waste management, and weapons proliferation have limited deployment, exacerbated in recent years by the Fukushima-Daiichi disaster in 2011.
Nonetheless, nuclear energy is projected to increase its share in the global mix under most scenarios, especially those assuming ambitious climate policies. The majority of growth in nuclear power generation is projected to come from Asia-Pacific, particularly China.
We define renewables to include power generation sources -hydro, biomass, wind, solar, and geothermal -as well as biofuels and traditional biomass or waste fuels. As noted above, some outlooks include non-marketed biomass (i.e., the IEA, ExxonMobil, OPEC and Shell), while others do not (i.e., the U.S. EIA and BP). The inclusion of non-marketed biomass adds a substantial share of total energy consumption to the renewables category. For example, the IEA estimates that renewables accounted for 13 percent of total energy demand in 2012, whereas BP, which does not include non-marketed biomass, estimates just four percent (Table 6 ).
While accounting methods vary, all projections are bullish on renewables, projecting them to be the fastest-growing fuel in the power sector and the largest contributor to capacity additions.
However, growth in electricity generation is led by coal and gas under some projections due to lower capacity factors for certain renewable sources. Data sources: Historical data from IEA (2014e) using the Reference Approach to estimate emissions. 7 Projections from IEA (2014f), U.S. EIA (2013b), ExxonMobil (2015) and Shell (2013) . 7 The Reference Approach is a standardized "top-down" approach for CO2 emission estimation developed by the IPCC. The IEA also uses a "Sectoral Approach" to estimate CO2 emissions. For a detailed explanaition of these approaches, see IEA (2014a). To better understand the implications of these projections for climate change, we can relate them to the Fifth Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), released in 2014. To avoid the worst effects of climate change, almost all governments have agreed to attempt to limit global average temperature increase to 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels, which corresponds to CO2-equivalent (CO2e) concentrations of around 450 parts-per-million (ppm) by 2100. While the IEA 450 Scenario aligns with this target, the other projections examined here are associated with higher global average temperature increases in the range 2.5°C or greater, and 3.5°C
or greater for emissions that do not peak within the next few decades. 
Policy support for renewables
Renewable electricity growth in the European Union, United States, and China, among other regions, has benefited from financial incentives and mandates designed to spur deployment. As costs for these technologies decrease, it is unclear whether policies will continue to heavily support renewables, or if they will diminish as targets are reached and public budgets tighten.
In 
Nuclear power in the OECD: challenges ahead
Nuclear power, along with hydroelectricity, has been the leading source of non-CO2 electricity across developed economies for decades. But these fleets are aging, and many face substantial economic and political challenges. The replacement options for retiring nuclear plants include: (1) fossil sources which would increase carbon dioxide emissions; (2) renewable sources which face challenges of intermittency and cost; and (3) new nuclear power, which also faces high costs, especially in developed economies.
In Japan, the 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi disaster led to a nationwide shutdown of nuclear stations, spurring increased generation from natural gas, coal, and oil-based power units. In North America, renewables and natural gas have put pressure on an aging nuclear fleet from two directions. Because wind tends to be most productive in the evening, prices during off-peak hours in certain regions may fall into low or even negative territory due to the neglible variable operating costs of wind power, thereby reducing revenues for base load generators such as nuclear. At the same time, low-cost natural gas has begun competing with nuclear to provide base load power, and several nuclear units have shut down in recent Global demand for petroleum and other liquids grows at a slower rate than previous decades, but absolute growth is similar to the 1980 to 2010 period (see Table 7 Global oil demand enjoys robust growth under every scenario except the IEA 450 Scenario. This demand is met by a range of suppliers, with OPEC gaining market share relative to the 40 percent it controlled in 2013, in all but one scenario. As Figure 14 and Table 8 Europe has the potential to increase energy production, but development remains uncertain.
Under all scenarios, natural gas production and consumption grow at a faster percentage rate than any other fossil fuel. As Table 9 shows, the West experiences consistent growth and remains the leading consumer of natural gas in 2040, while percentage growth rates are higher in the East. In percentage terms (and under some scenarios absolute terms), the region with the second most robust growth is the Middle East. Due in part to concern over rising domestic oil consumption, oil exporting nations have increasingly turned to natural gas resources to generate electricity, leaving more oil available for export. Under the most bullish projection (BP), Middle East natural gas consumption more than doubles by 2035.
In North America, continuing large-scale production of shale gas coupled with increased demand from the electricity and manufacturing sectors leads to substantial consumption growth.
Most projections are in relative agreement on the scale of this expansion, with consumption increasing by between 41 and 44 percent (30 to 37 bcf/d) over 2010 levels by 2040. Areas of uncertainty for North American natural gas consumption center on the implementation of CO2 regulations for power plants, the extent of increased natural gas demand for bulk chemicals and other manufacturing, and the scale of LNG exports over the coming decades.
In Europe and Eurasia, consumption grows by four to 30 percent (five to 35 bcf/d) under most scenarios, and the drivers of that growth vary substantially between projections. In the ExxonMobil Outlook, which other than the IEA 450 Scenario makes the most bearish forecast, the EU and Russia both grow steadily, while a slightly smaller share of growth is attributable to Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Under the more bullish IEA Current Policies and New Policies Scenarios, growth is led by Eastern Europe and Eurasia, while gas consumption in the EU and especially Russia grows more slowly.
Natural gas consumption in Africa and Latin America is more modest, with Africa adding between 14 and 18 bcf/d and Latin America adding between 11 and 20 bcf/day over the projection period. ExxonMobil and the IEA are most bullish about natural gas consumption growth in these regions, while the U.S. EIA projects slower growth.
Proved natural gas reserves are dominated by Russia, Iran, and Qatar, which respectively control 17 to 25 9 , 18, and 13 percent of global proven reserves (BP, 2014; U.S. EIA, 2013b).
However, the United States is currently the world's largest natural gas producer, with recent growth led by shale and other tight formations. Between 2005 and 2012, global natural gas production grew by 21 percent, led by the United States, Qatar, and China (BP, 2014).
Looking forward, the U.S. EIA projects production growth through 2040 to be led by Russia, the United States, Iran, and Qatar (U.S. EIA, 2013b). Projections show growth in the United States coming exclusively from shale and other tight formations, while growth in Russia and the Middle East mostly comes from conventional reservoirs (though shale gas contributes some additional supplies in Russia). Under all IEA Scenarios, production from non-OECD Asia roughly doubles, though the region still produces less gas than the United States, Russia, or the Middle East.
Unconventional gas also may provide substantial new supplies in other regions, but projections vary widely (see box).
9 BP estimates that Russia holds 17 percent of proved reserves, and the U.S. EIA estimates 25 percent.
Unconventional natural gas: moving beyond North America?
Natural gas production from shale and other tight formations has reshaped the North American natural gas market and affected global LNG trade flows. Through 2015, investments in shale development in China, Argentina, South Africa, Eastern Europe, and other regions have yet to yield large-scale natural gas or oil production. Lower oil prices will likely slow development of shale oil resources in Argentina and Russia, but natural gas prices remain relatively high in Europe and Asia, and several governments are actively promoting shale gas development.
BP projects roughly six percent of global natural gas production to come from shale gas outside North America by 2035, with most production coming from Europe/Eurasia (including Russia) and China. In its Reference Case, the U.S. EIA projects that shale gas, tight gas, and coalbed methane resources outside of North America will account for roughly 17 percent of global natural gas production by 2040, though they note that uncertainty remains high.
In China, home to the largest estimated shale gas resources, a variety of market reforms and incentives have been put in place to spur shale gas development. International oil companies, along with Chinese state-owned enterprises, have invested in the Sichuan basin, but production from shale formations was just 0.25 bcf/d in 2014 (U.S. EIA, 2015d). While the demand for gas is strong, several issues including lack of access to pipelines and water resources, limited incentives for state-owned enterprises, and limited geological data suggest that shale production in China is unlikely to approach the levels seen in the United States for the foreseeable future (Sandalow, Wu, Yang, Hove, & Lin, 2014; Tian, Wang, Krupnick, & Liu, 2014) . However, coalbed methane resources in China are substantial (Liu et al., 2009) , and may become a large supply source in coming years.
In Europe, political opposition has halted or slowed shale gas development in nations such as France and Germany. In the United Kingdom, exploration and testing has also met substantial political opposition, though the current government appears intent on continued exploration. In Eastern Europe, concerns over dependence on imported Russian gas supplies has led to substantial interest in developing shale resources in nations such as Poland, where over 60 exploratory shale wells have been drilled, as well as in Romania (Shale Gas Europe, 2015). However, early testing has not led to substantial production, and several major international oil and gas companies scaled back their investments during 2015.
Recent liberalization of the energy sector in Mexico has spurred interest in shale formations, and the U.S. EIA projects that unconventional gas production in Mexico will grow from zero today to nearly 5.5 bcf/d in 2040. Other nations with substantial shale resources include Algeria, Australia, and South Africa. Testing and exploration is currently underway in each of these nations, though future production remains uncertain.
The annexation of Crimea by Russia and conflict in Eastern Ukraine has increased concerns in Europe and Asia over reliance on Russian energy supplies, particularly through natural gas pipelines. These regions are heavily reliant on imported natural gas from Russia and other Caspian countries, and this reliance is projected to increase. From 2012 to 2040, the IEA New Policies Scenario projects reliance on imported gas to rise from 45 percent to 66 percent in OECD Europe, from 27 to 39 percent in China, from 31 to 45 percent India, and from 12 to 40 percent in other Asian nations. Figure 15 illustrates similar projections from ExxonMobil. Unconventional oil and gas production in North America has grown more rapidly than anticipated, with important implications for global oil and natural gas markets. At the same time, energy demand growth in China in 2014 was far more modest than most projections had anticipated, easing the pressure on global oil supplies and contributing to the 2014 collapse in oil prices. Costs for renewable electricity led by wind and solar have fallen more quickly than expected, making them cost-competitive with other fuels sources in some regions. These renewable sources will continue to grow rapidly under most projections.
Finally, CO2 emissions from the energy system continue to grow under most projections, leading to atmospheric concentrations of CO2 consistent with average global temperature increases in the range of close to 3°C or more unless more stringent policies are adopted or there are major zero-carbon technological breakthroughs. In contrast with these projections is the recent agreement among almost all countries to strengthen the response to climate change, with a goal of holding the increase in global average temperature to 2°C or less through nationally-determined policies.
